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Congress enacted amendments to the Clean Air Act of
19901 to regulate air pollution in all fifty states.2 Specifically,
these amendments were designed to "reduce ozone-forming vola-
tile organic compounds (VOCs) and emissions of toxic air pollut-
ants."3 The legislation required the use of reformulated gasoline
(RFG) in motor vehicles in areas with high levels of ozone and
smog.4 Initially, nine metropolitan areas identified as those hav-
ing the worst air pollution problems in the United States were re-
quired to use RFG in the summertime months.
5
The main aspect of RFG that separates it from regular
gasoline is its increased chemical oxygen content. 6 The increased
oxygen content enables the fuel to burn more completely and re-
duces the emissions of VOCs. 7 The amendments to the Clean Air
Act mandated that reformulated gasoline consist of at least two
percent oxygen by weight.8 Since gasoline does not naturally meet
the required oxygen content, gasoline manufacturers are required
to add oxygenates to the gasoline. 9
Methyl tertiary butyl ether, more commonly known as
MTBE, quickly became the petroleum manufacturers' "oxygenate
of choice,' 0 and is still the most popular oxygenate in the United
States." Manufacturers chose MTBE not only because it was ef-
fective at reducing air pollution, but also because it was easily and
'J.D. expected 2004, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.S. Chemical Engi-
neering, 2001, University of Kentucky.
1 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1995).
2Millet v. At. Richfield Co., No. CV-98-555, 2000 Me. Super. Lexis 39, at *1 (Me.
Super. Mar. 2,2000).
3In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prod. Liab. Litig., 175 F.Supp. 2d 593, 600
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) [hereinafter MTBE 1].4W. States Petroleum Ass'n. v. Dept. of Health Servs., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 117, 120
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
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efficiently manufactured and transported.' 2  Currently, MTBE is
added to approximately eighty-seven percent of the gasoline that is
"marketed, sold and used" in the United States. '3
MTBE is a hydrocarbon produced from methanol and iso-
butylene.14 It is characterized as small in molecular size, colorless,
and highly soluble in water."5 As a result of its high solubility and
its poor absorption by surrounding soils, MTBE can travel through
soil faster and farther than other gasoline components and can
easily migrate into groundwater. 6 Additionally, MTBE biode-
grades very slowly, if at all, causing it to endure in soil and
groundwater for decades. '
7
MTBE groundwater contamination is a major problem in
the United States because of its high solubility.18 Annually, over
nine million gallons of reformulated gasoline containing MTBE
enters the environment during transportation, storage, sale or use
in the United States.' 9 The primary source of MTBE groundwater
contamination comes from underground gasoline storage sys-
tems. 20 Furthermore, consumer overfills and spills at gas stations,
automobile accidents, improper disposal, and even rainfall are
sources of MTBE groundwater contamination.
21
The issue of MTBE groundwater contamination has led to
an even larger problem: drinking water contamination.2 2 MTBE
contaminates drinking water by leaving it with a turpentine-like
taste and odor.23 The foul taste and odor of MTBE-contaminated
24
water renders it unsafe for human consumption. Two of the
main concerns with MTBE are that it is a known animal carcino-
gen and it has been linked to several human health problems,
25
such as an increased chance of developing asthma, negative repro-
ductive and developmental effects, and such minor symptoms as
'2Ryan W. Herrick, MTBE or Not to Be?: Clean Air. Dirty Water, and Common Law
Nuisance, 30 MCGEORGE L.REV. 1325, 1332 (1999).
'
t
3n re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prod. Liab. Litig. 209 F.R.D. 323, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter MTBE 11].
14
MTBE 1, 175 F. Supp. 2d. at 599.
'
5




MTBE 11, 209 F.R.D. at 330.
18MTBE 1,175 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
1
91d.
aMTBE 11, 209 F.R.D. at 330.
2"id
"
"2Herrick, supra note 12, at 1327.
231d.
24





headaches, nausea, and dizziness. 26 In addition, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identified MTBE as
a possible human carcinogen.
27
Contamination of drinking water caused by the use of
MTBE in RFG has generated numerous lawsuits. The purpose of
this comment is to analyze this problem by examining an MTBE-
related class action lawsuit. This comment will discuss the back-
ground of the litigation, analyze the court's decision, and draw
conclusions about the future of MTBE class action certification
issues.
II. MTBE PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Products Liability Liti-
gation, was a consolidated, multi-district case, consisting of sev-
eral putative class actions brought on behalf of private well own-
ers asking for relief from threatened or actual contamination of
their wells.29 The plaintiffs primarily sought injunctive relief
against a number of petroleum companies who, it is alleged,
"knowingly caused the widespread contamination of groundwater
as a result of their use of a gasoline additive known as methyl ter-
tiary butyl ether.",
30
In MTBE I, five separate multi-district actions were before
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, including: (1) an individual claim by two private New York
well owners seeking damages and injunctive relief;31 (2) a class of
well owners in New York who may be at risk for contamination,
but had not been tested ("the 'non-test' plaintiffs"); 32 (3) a class of
well owners in sixteen states whose wells had been tested, but no
contamination of MTBE had been found ("the 'non-detect' plain-
tiffs"); 33 (4) a private well owner in Florida seeking to represent a
class of Florida well owners; 34 and (5) a class of private well own-
ers in New York whose wells had actually been contaminated with
MTBE 5
'6Herrick, supra note 12, at 1329.






3 Id. at 604.
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The court dismissed the claims of the "non-detect" and
"non-test" plaintiffs in MTBE I for a lack of standing because they
did not allege actual MTBE exposure, nor did they identify any
MTBE release sites close to their property.36 Nevertheless, the
court allowed the other three actions of the two private well own-
ers in New York, the private well owner in Florida, and the class
of private well owners in New York, allowing them to proceed
under a number of theories, including market-share liability, con-
cert of action, strict liability, negligence, failure to warn, public
nuisance, and conspiracy.37
Following the court's decision in MTBE I, the remaining
plaintiffs sought to invoke a class action against several oil com-
panies 38 alleging that one or more of the defendants had caused
actual contamination of their private well water.39  The main
causes of action alleged in the complaint included negligence,
strict liability, failure to warn, nuisance, trespass, and failure to
report toxic substance releases.40 The plaintiffs limited the puta-
tive class to only four states and were amenable to class certifica-
tion under Rule 23(b)(2) or (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.4'
A majority of state studies reported twenty percent of sam-
ples collected indicated MTBE contamination in their groundwa-
ter.42 However, a nationwide study showed that only one out of
2,243 public drinking wells contained MTBE at a level higher than
the EPA's advisory level of twenty parts per billion. It is impor-
tant to note that the present litigation focused on private wells, 44 so
this study can be misleading. Private wells are at a higher risk of
MTBE contamination because they are subject to little govern-
mental regulation, no federal or state testing requirements, and





33rhe oil companies sued were: Amerada Hess Corp., Atlanta Richfield Co., BP
Corp., Amoco Oil Co., Chevron U.S.A., Inc., CITGO Petroleum Corp., Conoco Inc., El Paso
CGP Co., Equilon Enterprises, LLC, Exxon Mobil Corp., Motiva Enterprises, LLC, Phillips
Petroleum Co., Shell Oil Co., Shell Oil Products Co., Sunoco, Inc., Texaco Refining and Mar-
keting, Inc., Tosco Corp., United Refining Co., and Valero Marketing and Supply Co. MTBE
11, 209 F.R.D. 323, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
391d. at 330.
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The plaintiffs sought to limit certification of the class to
claims for injunctive relief and damages proceeding on an individ-
ual basis.46 Plaintiffs asserted that a number of issues were rele-
vant to the entire class: MTBE's chemical characteristics, its inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of plaintiffs' property, and the
foreseeability of MTBE's environmental consequences. 47 Further-
more, the plaintiffs alleged certain aspects of the defendants' con-
duct were applicable to the entire class. 48 These issues were the
defendants' knowledge of MTBE's negative characteristics, par-
ticipation in misleading plaintiffs, failure to warn of potential
harmfulness of MTBE, causation, joint liability, and knowledge of
the existence of possible alternative oxygenates.49
In addition to the issues relevant to each class member, the
plaintiffs felt that notification by publication would give other
potential class members an opportunity to become part of the
class. 50 The Plaintiffs limited the class to members who could
meet the following criteria: (1) they own or have an interest in the
real property; (2) such property has at least one water well on it;
(3) such well is contaminated with a detectable level of MTBE; (4)
such well is capable of providing a source of drinking water; and
(5) such property is located in New York, California, Illinois, or
Florida.51 Furthermore, private well owners would have to test
their own water for MTBE contamination in order to become a
class member.
52
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 53 estab-
lishes the standard for class certification. 54 It sets forth four pre-
requisites that must be met by the class before certification: (1)
the class must be so numerous that it is impracticable to join all
members of the class (numerosity requirement); (2) common ques-
tions of law or fact must exist with respect to each member of the
class (commonality requirement); (3) the claims of the representa-
tive party must be typical of the claims of the entire class (typical-
ity requirement); and (4) the representative party must fairly and







MTBE I1, 209 F.R.D. at 334-35.
"Id. at 335.
521d.
"FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
14MTBE 11, 209 F.R.D. at 336.
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representation requirement). 55 Plaintiffs have the burden of proof
in establishing that each requirement for class certification is
met. 56 A court must be satisfied after "rigorous analysis" that all
of the criteria set forth in Rule 23 are met before class certification
will be granted.
5 7
In MTBE II, the court concluded that the plaintiffs met the
burden of establishing the first two prerequisites set forth in Rule
23(a). 58 The court did not address the commonality requirement
because it concluded that the "defendants appear to concede that
plaintiffs have identified at least one common question of law and
fact, and have thus satisfied the commonality requirement."5 9 In
addition, the court noted the Plaintiffs made "a reasonable esti-
mate of class size numbering in the tens of thousands," thereby
- 60fulfilling the numerosity requirement.
Furthermore, the court discussed the implied requirement
of ascertainability.61 "Rule 23(a) does not expressly require that a
class be definite in order to be certified, [but) a requirement that
there be an identifiable class has been implied by the courts.,
62
The test for determining ascertainability is whether a class may be
identified by referring to objective criteria.63  In MTBE I, the
court concluded the ascertainablity requirement was met because
the plaintiffs' class was based solely on objective criteria: "either
a well has MTBE or it does not; either an individual has an owner-
ship interest or she does not; either her property is located in a
class state or it is not." 64
However, the court concluded the plaintiffs had not estab-
lished the typicality and adequacy requirements.65 The typicality
requirement is established pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3), "where each
member's claim arises from the same course of events and each
class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defen-
dant's liability. '66 The court relied on the fact that the plaintiffs
sought to use market-share liability against the defendants to show
SFED, R. CIV. P. 23(a).
5
6Pccere v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 194 F.R.D. 66,69 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
57Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
"MTBE I, 209 F.R.D. at 336.
"Id. at 336 n.19.
60Id.
61Id. at 336.
62Alliance to End Repression v. Rochord, 565 F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1977).
6
3
Zapka v. Coca-Cola Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16552 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
"MTBE II, 209 F.R.D. 323, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
"Id. at 337-40.
"Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147,155 (2nd Cir. 2001).
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that the typicality requirement was not met. 7 The court con-cluded,
Most of the class representatives can identify a
responsible gasoline manufacturer with ease be-
cause they live near a point source of gasoline
pollution, and therefore face an uphill battle in
utilizing a market share theory. The ambient
well owners, on the other hand, cannot identify
the manufacturer or manufacturers of the MTBE
that allegedly contaminates their wells. Thus, in
this critical respect, the named plaintiffs claims
are not typical of the claims of the class.68
Furthermore, the court determined the plaintiffs failed to
meet the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule
23(a)(4).69 Under the adequacy requirement, "plaintiffs must
show that the proposed action will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. ' 70 Additionally, the plaintiffs must show
that the class representative's interests do not conflict with any of
the other class members and that all members share the -need to
actively and strongly prosecute the action.
71
The court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the test of
"adequacy of representation" for two reasons. First, since the
class was attempting certification under Rule 23(b)(2), there was
no opt-out provision for members of the class. Thus, the court did
not believe the absent class members with personal injury or prop-
erty claims could be adequately represented by the class represen-
tatives who only sought injunctive relief.72 Second, the court had
a major concern about "whether the named plaintiffs' stake in the
action was substantial enough, relative to class members who suf-
fered personal injury, to prosecute the action vigorously on behalf
of the absent class members.
73
A plaintiff must not only establish the four express prereq-
uisites in Rule 23(a)(l)-(4) for certification, but must also show
that the action is maintainable according to one of three proposed
"MTBE II, 209 F.R.D. at 337.
6 I. at 338
691d. at 340.
7°Banyai v. Mazur, 205 F.R.D. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
1Robinson, 267 F.3d at 170.
"MTBE 1, 209 F.R.D. at 339.
"Id. at 339.
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classes contained in Rule 23(b).74 Rule 23(b) authorizes three
types of classes: (1) prejudice class actions in which separate ac-
tions by or against individual members of the class create a risk of
inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class; (2) injunctive class actions in which the
defendants have acted or refused to act in a manner generally ap-
plicable to the entire class, thereby making injunctive relief ap-
propriate; or (3) damage class actions in which questions of law or
fact dominate over any other questions and a class action is the
best method of adjudication of the matter (damage class action).75
The plaintiffs contended the proposed class met the first
requirement of Rule 23(b)(2) "because the defendants conspired to
use MTBE in their gasoline and promote its continued use, despite
their knowledge of MTBE's dangerous properties. 7 6 The court
did not necessarily dispute the plaintiffs claim, however, it did
not find that the second prong of Rule 23(b)(2) was met.77 Rather,
the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to show injunctive relief
was appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. 78 The court
explained that "the hallmark of the (b)(2) action is homogene-
ity,"7 9 instead finding individualized issues, such as whether own-
ers of underground storage tanks (USTs) were warned about leak-
age in each class member's neighborhood and whether each class
member was warned of the existence of MTBE. In addition,
whether each class member suffered an actual inju 7 from MTBE
was another individual concern that was dispositive.
In the alternative, plaintiffs argued the class met the re-
quirements of Rule 23(b)(3).8 ' The court also denied class certifi-
cation under Rule 23(b)(3) because there were too many individ-
ual issues within the proposed class and class treatment was not
superior to other methods of adjudicating MTBE drinking water
contamination claims.82 Because the plaintiffs did not meet the
typicality and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) or the main-
tainability requirement of Rule 23(b), the court denied the motion
74
1d. at 340-41,75
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b).
'
6






d. at 343 (quoting Arnold v. UA Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 450 (N.D.
Cal. 1994)).







III. ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION
The court's decision in MTBE II not only burdened the
plaintiffs and potential class members, it also created uncertainty
as to the future of MTBE litigation. First, there is plenty of evi-
dence in the background of the case that MTBE drinking water
contamination is a problem in the U.S. 84 For example, a March
2000 EPA report notes that most states reported MTBE existed in
twenty percent of groundwater samples.85 Additionally, there is
ample evidence that MTBE is a harmful chemical that plays a role
in many potential health problems.86 A number of studies have
found that MTBE is carcinogenic and harmful to the human repro-
ductive system.
87
Furthermore, the court's decision created uncertainty in fu-
ture class certification issues because the plaintiffs met their bur-
den of proving the requirements of Rule 23. The court's decision
not to certify the class essentially rested on three grounds: (1) the
typicality requirement; (2) the adequacy requirement; and (3) the
maintainability requirement.88 The court found no support in the
plaintiffs' arguments concerning the typicality requirement, that
"due to the large number of possible sources and the extreme
solubility and mobility of MTBE in the environment, ambient non-
point source contamination by MTBE is common."8 9 The motivat-
ing factor behind the court's decision regarding typicality was that
some members of the class could easily ascertain which defendant
had contaminated their well, while other plaintiffs would not be
able to identify a specific defendant. 90 While the typicality re-
quirement would have been met if the court had accepted the
Plaintiffs' theory, it instead dismissed the Plaintiffs' theory en-
tirely by stating, "it is unclear, however, whether any named plain-
tiff or declarant fits this description.'
9'




mSee id at 328-31.
87Herrick, supra note 12, at 1325.
BBMTBE IL 209 F.R.D. at 336-50.
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demanding." 92 The typicality requirement does not require that
each plaintiff suffer an injury in the exact same way, only that "the
claims of the named plaintiffs arise from the same practice or
course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the proposed
class members. 93 Since this standard was not difficult to meet, it
seems that the plaintiffs should have easily met their burden.
Nevertheless, the court tried to justify its position by stating, "The
contamination of each named plaintiff's well comes about through
a factually unique set of circumstances, e.g., a leaking UST owned
by Big Saver, a burst pipeline, etc."94 However, the court's ra-
tionale is not persuasive. Clearly, each named plaintiff in the liti-
gation suffered harm from MTBE contamination and the precise
cause of contamination should not be relevant to the typicality
inquiry.
In addition to erring with respect to the typicality require-
ment, the court failed to take into account important considera-
tions with respect to the adequacy requirement. The plaintiffs
noted that "courts generally allow plaintiffs in class actions to sue
for injunctive relief on behalf of the class and then bring damages
claims in subsequent individual actions." 95  In Norris v. Slot-
houber,96 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held "a suit for damages is not precluded by reason of
the plaintiffs membership in a class for which no monetary relief
is sought." 97 Thus, it seems clear that if plaintiffs only seek in-
junctive relief, then the adequacy of representation requirement
would be met since all members of the class would be seeking the
same goal and all plaintiffs with a claim for damages would be
adequately represented.
Finally, the court found that the Plaintiffs failed to show
the action was maintainable under one of the Rule 23(b) prongs:
prejudice class action, injunctive class action or damage class ac-
tion. 98 Although the Plaintiffs did not adequately prove they met
the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), the class could have been certi-
fied pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). In Barnes v. American Tobacco
Co.,99 the Third Circuit noted that a court must "ensure that indi-
vidual issues do not pervade the entire action [because] the suit
9 Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993).
93
Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 2d 662, 691 (SD.N.Y. 1996).
94MTBE HI, 209 F.R.D. at 337.
95
d. at 339.
9'Norris v. Slothouber, 718 F.2d 1116, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
"Id. at 1117.
9'MTBE 11, 209 F.R.D. at 340-51.
99Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3rd Cir. 1998).
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could become unmanageable and little value would be gained in
proceeding as a class action if significant individual issues were to
arise consistently."'00 As such, the court erred in concluding that
individual issues pervaded the entire action.
The issues relevant to each member of the proposed class
in the MTBE litigation are the same: the level of contamination,
the source of contamination, and the effects of contamination on
each class member.'O' It is difficult to understand what individual
issues will pervade this class action. The court tried to justify its
reasoning by noting that "the level at which people perceive the
presence of MTBE in water varies significantly" and "not all indi-
viduals respond equally to taste and odor because of differences in
individual sensitivity."' 10 2 However, the court in its attempted jus-
tification admitted that a contamination problem existed. The very
reasoning the court used to show an apparent maintainability prob-
lem was that individuals recognize and are affected by MTBE con-
tamination differently. Thus, the court seems to have admitted
contamination existed in the plaintiffs' wells, yet refused to hear
the Plaintiffs' cause of action.
In conclusion, the court looks only superficially at the
plaintiffs' complaint and the issues in this case by concluding that
"a classwide trial of these claims would be inefficient and unman-
ageable.""1 3 In essence, by refusing class certification, the court
gave petroleum manufacturers using MTBE an excuse not to take
contamination problems seriously. The court concluded that class
certification would be inefficient; yet individual adjudication of
these matters would not only be inefficient, but unfair to the plain-
tiffs as well.
The court's failure to issue class certification essentially
awarded the defendant oil companies a free pass to continue to
avoid taking protective measures against MTBE contamination
because individual plaintiffs are unlikely to have the economic
resources to battle a large petroleum company one-on-one in the
courtroom. Furthermore, the problems associated with MTBE
drinking water contamination are clearly documented and do not
appear to be going away.' 4 The problems range from causing
drinking water to have a foul taste and odor'0 5 to causing such
"Old. at 143.
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possible serious heath effects as cancer.1
0 6
Finally, this court recognized not only the dangers associ-
ated with MTBE-contamination, but also that there was actual
contamination in this case.'0 7 Moreover, the contamination was
not only limited to a few isolated instances, but possibly affected
several tens of thousands individuals within the class states (New
York, California, Illinois, and Florida).108 Thus, a class action
seemed like an appropriate course of action. Additionally, the
court concluded that the class met the first two requirements of
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: numerosity and
commonality. 0 9 While the Plaintiffs also offered evidence that
the typicality and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were met, the court
refused to issue class certification.' 0
Individual adjudication of these issues will not only be an
inefficient use of judicial resources, it will also burden individual
plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court should have issued class certifi-
cation so these plaintiffs would be able to compete with the petro-
leum companies on a more level playing field and should have
held the petroleum companies accountable for the MTBE drinking
water contamination problem.
' Herrick, supra note 12, at 1325.
...MTBE I, 209 F.R.D. at 346.
"Ild. at 337.
'°fd.
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